Somewhere between the mangroves and the infield dirt of Bohol’s first elite baseball academy, one seat is open at a table that does not appear often in Southeast Asian business: a genuine 40-percent equity stake across six revenue-generating assets, held not by a passive investor but by a working partner — a Club President with the Japanese market access, the baseball credibility, and the operational appetite to help build something without precedent in Philippine sports.

That is not a ceremonial title. It is a commercial mandate. This article works through each of the six assets that constitute the Bohol Coconuts operation, assigns a 10-year revenue projection to each, and aggregates them into a composite picture of what the Club President’s equity stake could produce by 2036 — alongside an honest account of the risks that stand between the projection and the result.

The analysis is structured the way a serious partner would want to see it: asset by asset, assumption by assumption, with the risks surfaced explicitly rather than buried in footnotes.

That is Coach Merv Moore speaking — the Texas-born baseball coach and co-founder who arrived in Bohol not with a development grant but with a construction plan. The distinction matters, because it is the difference between a dependency model and a revenue model. What Merv and his co-founder Lerma Moore have built — or are building — is the latter: a compound where hospitality revenue funds athletic development, media amplifies both, and real estate anchors the whole structure to something physical and transferable.

The Club President and Business Partner holds 40% of that structure. The founding team retains 60% and final strategic authority. But the role is not a figurehead position — it carries real commercial weight: sponsorship development in Japan, broadcaster and tourism board relationships, day-to-day marketing leadership, and a visible presence in the docuseries that is already building its audience. The 40% figure is what that work earns, compounded across a decade.

The most legible asset in the portfolio is also the most straightforward. The Coconuts Performance Center is being built around a seven-suite eco-lodge whose nightly rates are tiered by room category: ₱4,000 (~$70) for the entry suite, ₱6,300 (~$110) for the VIP Double, and ₱9,450 (~$165) for the Executive. These are not speculative numbers. They sit within — and in some cases below — the mid-market range for boutique eco-lodge accommodation in Bohol’s increasingly competitive tourism corridor.

Bohol receives over 1.2 million tourist arrivals annually in pre-pandemic benchmarks, with a growing Japanese and Korean segment drawn by the island’s combination of natural heritage, diving, and relative affordability compared to Palawan or Boracay. A sports tourism overlay — bringing families, scouts, and coaches to a facility with genuine athletic credentials — adds a demand layer that generic resorts cannot replicate.

The moderate scenario — 50% occupancy — is the working assumption for this analysis. It is achievable by any professionally managed eco-lodge in a mid-tier Philippine tourism market within three to five years of operation. The $251,850 that flows to the Club President’s equity from this single asset alone already establishes the arithmetic logic of the partnership. The lodge is not a side business. It is the financial foundation on which the entire operation rests — and the Club President holds 40% of it.

The Coconuts Performance Center is not merely a backdrop for the lodging business. It is the reason the lodging business has any differentiation at all. The academy component — coaching-intensive development for elite teenage prospects — generates its own revenue stream through program fees, tournament hosting, and eventually, player placement commissions.

Baseball economics in Southeast Asia are nascent but accelerating. Japan’s NPB and the US MLB both maintain active scouting infrastructure in the Philippines. A credentialed facility with documented outcomes — players placed, statistics tracked, camps attended — commands training fees of ₱15,000 to ₱40,000 per player per program cycle. At a conservative cohort of 20 active players, two program cycles per year, and a blended fee of ₱20,000 per cycle, the math is straightforward.

These figures do not include tournament hosting revenue, camp fees from visiting teams, or placement commissions — all of which carry industry precedent and all of which become available as the facility’s reputation compounds. A Club President with existing relationships in Japanese baseball will recognize the model immediately: it mirrors the juku-style structured development academies that have proven commercially durable in Japan’s own youth sports industry for decades. More importantly, a partner with those relationships is positioned to accelerate this revenue channel faster than any other single factor in the projection.

The third asset is the least tangible and, potentially, the most asymmetric. The Bohol Coconuts story is being documented as a long-form docuseries — “Building the Coconuts” — that follows the construction of the facility, the development of its players, and the human story of two founders building something consequential in a place that did not ask for it but needs it.

Documentary content about youth sports, international development, and underdog narratives has proven commercially viable across streaming platforms that now pay meaningfully for Southeast Asian originals. A production with authentic footage, real stakes, and a compounding story arc — one that can be pitched to Japanese broadcasters with an existing interest in Philippine baseball scouting — is not a vanity project. It is a distributable asset.

Conservative treatment of the media asset assigns it a modest $28,000 over a decade to the Club President’s equity. A single licensing deal with a mid-tier streaming platform changes that figure materially. The Club President appears in the docuseries — not as a producer or observer, but as a visible principal of the organization, a face the audience associates with the brand. That visibility has commercial value that does not appear in any of these tables, and a partner with Japanese media relationships is positioned to convert it into one.

A credentialed sports facility in a tropical destination is not a niche proposition. It is a specific product that an identifiable buyer purchases annually: youth sports travel coordinators, summer camp operators, college coaches running international tours, and Japanese high school baseball programs whose budgets for overseas training have historically been substantial.

Koushien culture in Japan — the near-religious attachment to high school baseball — has produced a well-documented export market for international training camps. Bohol, with direct access from Cebu, English-speaking coaching staff, and a documented development program, sits in an underserved position in that market. The visiting team economy generates lodge bookings, facility rental fees, coaching session revenue, and F&B — all of which funnel back through the 40% structure.

The sports tourism channel is the most Japan-specific opportunity in the portfolio — and the one most directly accelerated by the right Club President. A partner who can walk into a conversation with a Japanese high school baseball program director, an NPB scout coordinator, or a university athletic department and speak with genuine authority about what Bohol offers is not replicating something that already exists. There is no competing facility. There is no established Philippine destination for serious Japanese baseball travel. The Club President who builds those relationships is building the market from scratch — and holding 40% of the revenue it generates.

This asset is structural rather than directly monetized in the traditional sense — but it is not financially irrelevant. The Coconuts Performance Center operates a soup kitchen, a tutoring program, and a strict academic eligibility policy for its players. This is not marketing. It is operating discipline. And it has a financial corollary.

Corporate Social Responsibility budgets from Japanese corporations operating in the Philippines — and there are many — represent a documented and recurring funding stream for programs that can demonstrate accountability, measurability, and local credibility. A facility with documented feeding numbers, academic records, and a media footprint that makes the impact visible is a natural recipient of those allocations.

Grant and CSR revenue does not flow through the 40% structure directly. Its value to the Club President is protective: every peso of institutional support reduces the operating pressure on the lodging and academy businesses, which means equity distributions are less likely to be absorbed by operational shortfalls. A partner with existing relationships inside Japanese corporations active in the Philippines — and there are many — is positioned to pursue these allocations in ways the founding team, working from Bohol, cannot. In financial terms, this is a margin stabilizer. In partnership terms, it is one more area where the right person creates value that the numbers in this analysis have not yet counted.

The sixth asset is the physical compound itself — the real estate in which the partnership is inscribed. Bohol real estate has tracked Philippine GDP growth broadly while outperforming on premium hospitality assets tied to specific tourism drivers. The Panglao-Tagbilaran corridor, where tourism infrastructure is concentrated, has seen boutique hospitality valuations appreciate at 6–9% per annum in the decade preceding 2024.

An Executive Suite valued at $12,000 in 2026, appreciating at a conservative 6% compound rate, carries a nominal value of approximately $21,500 by 2036 — before any operational cash flow is considered. These figures assume no development premium, no media brand premium, and no scarcity premium from Bohol’s limited supply of credentialed sports-adjacent hospitality assets. A Club President who helps drive the brand’s profile — in Japan and internationally — is directly contributing to the appreciation trajectory of the asset in which their equity is held.

Across the six asset categories — lodge operations, academy program fees, media licensing, sports tourism, CSI margin protection, and real estate appreciation — the Club President and Business Partner participates in the following composite return picture at the moderate (50% occupancy / mid-yield) scenario:

Even the conservative scenario returns approximately $198,000 to the Club President’s equity over the decade. These are not projections that require optimism to generate. They require operational execution — and the right partner, working the Japanese market with genuine authority and genuine relationships, is the single variable most likely to move the actual outcome toward the upper end of the range.